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STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT, AND
DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY: IS
THERE A CROCODILE IN THE BATHTUB?
Robert F. Utter*
Abstract: Justice Robert F. Utter of the Washington Supreme Court analyzes the nature
of judicial review by state courts interpreting state constitutions. The Article emphasizes
the democratic nature of state court decisions. The public may counteract unpopular state
court opinions by either voting state court judges out of office or by amending the state
constitution. On the other hand, court opinions may be either affirmatively approved or
ratified by inaction. State courts also serve as experimental laboratories for the United
States Supreme Court by gauging the public response to and practicality of constitutional
doctrines. Justice Utter suggests that the more democratic influence upon state court deci-
sions infuses those opinions with greater democratic legitimacy than opinions of the
United States Supreme Court. To the extent state opinions are adopted by the United
States Supreme Court, the high court partakes of the more democratic aspects of state
court constitutional law development.
There's no way a judge is going to be able to ignore the political conse-
quences of certain decisions, especially if he or she has to make them
near election time. That would be like ignoring a crocodile in your
bathtub.1
In reality, judges are not asked to refrain from deciding political
questions at all; rather they are asked to refrain from deciding political
questions in too openly partisan a fashion.... Paradoxically, the effec-
tiveness of an appellate judicial decision is related to its ability to tran-
scend mere partisanship; and yet the more effective a decision, the wider
its political impact.2
The question of the proper role of the judiciary in a democratic soci-
ety brings two factors into inevitable tension. The first is the ideal of
* Justice, Washington Supreme Court. B.S., 1951, University of Washington; LL.B., 1954,
University of Washington School of Law. I wish to express my sincere appreciation to my law
clerk, Rebekah Ross, for her major role in bringing the thoughts contained here into article form.
Her previous experience as a member of the Stanford Law Review helped to sharpen and define
many of the concepts in the article. In addition, my extern and future clerk, Kara Larsen, of the
University of Washington, spent many hours collecting and summarizing the materials in the
first two sections.
1. Former California Supreme Court Justice Otto Kaus, quoted in Reidinger, The Politics of
Judging, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1, 1987, at 52, 58.
2. G. WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION 371 (1976).
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an independent judiciary, one capable of demanding strict adherence
to the law no matter how unpopular the result. The second is the ideal
of democratic accountability of the public servant no matter what the
position of power. The more the judiciary is independent of popular
pressures, the greater the risk of the judiciary straying from strongly-
held popular values. However, the more the judiciary is accountable
to popular pressures, the greater the risk it may lose its role of
independent protector of nonmajoritarian interests and rights.
This Article does not attempt to suggest a resolution to these com-
peting tensions. Courts seek to resolve daily the reconciliation of con-
flicts between varied and competing interests.3 By addressing these
issues, courts are continually involved in developing jurisprudence
independent of the public will, while at the same time retaining a
degree of public acceptance.'
Many state courts in recent years have interpreted their state consti-
tutions differently from the federal constitutional doctrine developed
by the United States Supreme Court.' On the state level, the debate
about the proper scope of judicial review must alter because, unlike
the federal courts, state courts typically are democratically accounta-
ble. In most states, citizens may register discontent with judicial deci-
sions either by voting judges out of office or by amending the state's
constitution to undo unpopular constitutional interpretation.6 State
courts that independently interpret state constitutions furnish the
state's legislators, media, and voters of their states an opportunity to
react to those decisions. In many states where the state supreme court
has independently construed the state constitution, the reaction has
been favorable; in others, there have been campaigns either to remove
judges or to amend the state constitution. Although those campaigns
have occasionally met success, more often they have failed.7 Even
more often, state legislators and citizens accept state court decisions
without any organized challenge against the court's state constitu-
tional analysis.
3. But what interests there are in a society and which of these are, and which should be,
the subject of legal recognition are questions partly for sociology, partly for law and partly
for ethics; and the reconciliation of conflicts between competing interests is in a broad sense
part of the problem of justice.
P. FITZGERALD, SALMOND ON JURISPRUDENCE 64 (12th ed. 1966).
4. For an account of how these issues have affected the history of the Washington Supreme
Court, see C. SHELDON, A CENTURY OF JUDGING-A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE
WASHINGTON SUPREME COURT (1988).
5. See infra notes 54-93 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 94-166 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 110-158 and accompanying text.
Vol. 64:19, 1989
State Constitutional Law and Democratic Accountability
This Article first discusses the current form and historic roots of the
debate over the legitimacy and scope of judicial review.8 The discus-
sion then transfers questions raised by the debate to the arena of state
court jurisprudence. Democratic responses to independent state juris-
prudence follow. This Article then suggests that the availability of
these democratic checks gives state constitutional jurisprudence a
democratic legitimacy absent at the federal level. In conclusion, it
asks whether incorporation of the analysis of the state court decisions
by the United States Supreme Court vests their own decisions with a
degree of democratic legitimacy said to be currently lacking in our
federal jurisprudence.
I. JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A CONSTITUTIONAL
DEMOCRACY
A. The Bork Hearings
With the July 1, 1987 nomination of Robert Bork to a position on
the United States Supreme Court, the continuing debate over the legit-
imate scope of judicial review moved out of the courtroom and law
school classroom and into the public arena.9
The stage was set for this classic discussion in a speech Attorney
General Edwin Meese III gave to the American Bar Association,
attacking several United States Supreme Court opinions and urging
the Court to apply a "Jurisprudence of Original Intention."' Robert
Bork, advocating in numerous writings the theory of original intent
and judicial restraint, was a logical choice by the Reagan administra-
tion to be the flag-carrier of this doctrine into the Court.
The Bork nomination was controversial due to the perceived danger
that his conservative jurisprudence would upset the ideological bal-
8. See infra notes 9-53 and accompanying text.
9. The American public had a greater lesson on the Constitution in its 200th anniversary
than probably at any time in its history. I think the debate by everyone's admission was
high-minded and was on the issues.... It amazed me: I'd get on the train and people would
talk to me about the 14th Amendment.
Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Joseph Biden quoted in Reske, Did Bork Say Too Much?,
A.B.A. J., DEC. 1, 1987, at 74, 75.
10. Meese, The Attorney General's View of the Supreme Court: Toward a Jurisprudence of
Original Intention, 45 PuB. ADMIN. REV. 701 (1985) [hereinafter Meese, The Attorney General's
View] (based on the 1985 speech); Intent of the Framers, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 28, 1985, at 97.
Attorney General Meese has continued his campaign for "original intent" interpretation, alleging
the approach to constitutional interpretation taken by many current judges and scholars appears
to be "to view the United States Constitution as a document virtually without legally significant,
discernible meaning." Meese, Toward a Jurisprudence of Original Intent, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 5, 5 (1988).
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ance of the Supreme Court and affect its decisions for many years,1
Thus, although Bork framed his approach as applying "neutral princi-
ples,"' 2 the debate surrounding his nomination was an intensely polit-
ical battle. 13
Bork's views on the proper scope of judicial review, which he cham-
pioned and defended in more than thirty hours of testimony before the
Senate Judiciary Committee, were originally stated in a 1971 Indiana
Law Journal article. 4 Bork considers judicial review legitimate only if
the Court defines and then applies neutral principles, leaving questions
of "liberty" and "equality" for the political process.' 5 This analysis
rejects entire lines of decisions by the United States Supreme Court.
Griswold v. Connecticut 16 and Shelley v. Kraemer 7 serve as examples.
Cases like these, in Bork's view, typify the Court's development of
liberties based on value decisions rather than mandates from the
explicit language of the United States Constitution or the discernable
intent of the framers.
Beyond the perceived threat to decisions that benefit women, minor-
ities, and privacy interests, many have challenged Bork's views on two
fronts. The first is that judges do not and cannot know the framers'
intent or how it would apply to many of today's problems, which are
different in kind rather than degree from those problems envisioned by
the framers.' 8 Expanding this criticism, Professor Ronald Dworkin
points out that "original intent" analysis fails to take into account that
many people, in many tiers of review, were involved in the drafting
and ratification of the United States Constitution. Dworkin stresses
11. See, e.g., Moran, Biden Taps Scholars to Rake Bork Record, Legal Times, July 13, 1987,
at 1, col. 3.
12. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971).
13. Politics swirled around the nominee from the start, with intense lobbying efforts
mounted by those for and against Bork. Money was raised and spent, radio and television
ads were aired and piles of briefing books were issued by everyone from the White House
and Justice Department to interest groups on the left and right, all designed to show Bork
either as a saint or the devil incarnate.
Reske, supra note 9, at 74.
14. Bork, supra note 12.
15. "There is no principled way in which anyone can define the spheres in which liberty is
required and the spheres in which equality is required. These are matters of morality, of
judgment, of prudence. They belong, therefore, to the political community. In the fullest sense,
these are political questions." Id. at 12.
16. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (striking a statute prohibiting use of contraceptives by married
couples, invoking "privacy rights" in the Constitution); see Bork, supra note 12, at 7-12.
17. 334 U.S. I (1948) (state enforcement of a private racially restrictive covenant violates the
fourteenth amendment); see Bork, supra note 12, at 15-17.
18. McMahon, Wachtler Critical of Bork's 'Original Intent' Philosophy, N.Y. L.J., July 7,
1987, at 1.
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that the intent of those people can be viewed at several levels of
abstraction. 19
The second criticism of the "original intent" interpretation is that
the protection of individual and privacy freedoms has long been
viewed as a unique and continuing judicial obligation. Justice William
Brennan has noted that the Constitution's longevity lies within the
"adaptability of its great principles to cope with current problems and
current needs."2" Proponents of this argument point out that relying
upon 200 year-old interpretations of a document that announces fun-
damental principles would lead to doctrinal stagnation."
Although these criticisms demonstrate both the difficulties of neu-
trally applying the doctrine of original intent and the great loss to indi-
vidual freedoms that would result from the doctrine's application,
there is one aspect of Bork's criticism that has broad apparent appeal.
The foundation of Bork's criticism is the "seeming anomaly of judicial
supremacy in a democratic society."12 2  Bork asserts the power of
judges to govern areas not mandated by specific clauses of the Consti-
tution "is not legitimate in a democracy:",2 3 These concerns lead Bork
to the conclusion that the democratic system requires judges to strictly
circumscribe their power.24 Thus, courts are being asked to apply the
intent of the framers 200 years ago, not because the framers' intent is
better in and of itself, but because by following this exercise courts will
not overstep their role in a democratic system. This returns us to the
debate over the democratic legitimacy of judicial review.
19. R. DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 33-57 (1985); Blum, The Hearings and Original
Intent, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1, 1987, at 78 (interview with Ronald Dworkin); see also Brennan, The
Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 433, 435 (1986);
Simon, The Authority of the Framers of the Constitution: Can Originalist Interpretation be
Justified?, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1482 (1985).
20. Brennan, supra note 19, at 438; see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,
415 (1819) (Chief Justice Marshall's statement that the Constitution is "intended to endure for
ages to come, and consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs").
21. "1 believe that we make a serious mistake to accept the belief that the past has done its
work for the present, and that our liberty, which is the cornerstone of our democracy, is
guaranteed." McMahon, supra note 18, at 2.
Stanford Law School Dean Paul Brest is also a strong critic of the "original intent" approach.
He concludes an article discussing approaches to constitutional interpretation: "[O]ne can better
protect fundamental values and the integrity of democratic processes by protecting them than by
guessing how other people meant to govern a different society a hundred or more years ago."
Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204, 238 (1980).
22. Bork, supra note 12, at 2.
23. Bork, Original Intent-The Only Legitimate Basis for Constitutional Decision Making, 26
JUDGES J. 13, 14 (Summer 1987).
24. "The only way in which the Constitution can constrain judges is if the judges interpret the
document's words according to the intentions of those who drafted, proposed, and ratified its
provisions and its various amendments." Id.
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B. Historic Roots of the Debate
Predating Marbury v. Madison,25 the concept of judicial review-
permitting courts to overturn legislation that violates a more "funda-
mental law"-was used by courts in the colonies and in state courts
after independence.26 State court as well as lower federal court deci-
sions foreshadowed Marbury v. Madison and generally stated that the
power to overturn legislation as unconstitutional should be wielded
only where the violation is very clear.27
Since Marbury v. Madison, it has been settled that the Court may
and will assert the right to find legislative acts unconstitutional and
void.28 Voices challenging judicial review as having no basis in the
Constitution's language or in the intent of the framers have lessened in
this half of the century.29 Nevertheless, the lingering questions about
the proper scope of judicial review in a democratic system continue to
trouble judges and scholars.
Harvard law professor James B. Thayer was an early advocate of
the position that, if the United States Supreme Court exercised judicial
review at all, it must do so with great restraint." Thayer's thinking
affected Justices Holmes, Brandeis, and Frankfurter, the careers of
whom all stand for the doctrine of judicial self-restraint. 3
In contrast, Horace Lurton, Associate Justice on the United States
Supreme Court from 1909 to 1914, was an early defender of judicial
review. He argued that public opinion and the oath of office are insuf-
ficient guarantees of ensuring that legislators stay within constitutional
boundaries and that the courts are necessary to restrain the executive
25. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
26. Corwin, The Establishment of Judicial Review, 9 MICH. L. REv. 102 (1910).
27. "But the violation must be plain and clear, or there might be danger of the judiciary
preventing the operation of laws which might be productive of much public good." Kamper v.
Hawkins, 1 Va. Cas. 20, 61, (1793) (Tyler, J., concurring); see also Thayer, The Origin and Scope
of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REv. 129 (1893).
28. This is despite the following prediction:
The interference of the judiciary with legislative Acts, if frequent or on dubious grounds,
might occasion so great a jealousy of this power and so general a prejudice against it as to
lead to measures ending in the total overthrow of the independence of the judges, and so of
the best preservative of the constitution.
Administrators of Byrne v. Administrators of Stewart, 1 S.C. Eq. (3 Des.) 466 (1812), quoted in
Thayer, supra note 27, at 142.
29. Even Judge John B. Gibson of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, an early opponent to
judicial review, recanted his bold views challenging the legitimacy of judicial review,
acknowledging the necessity for review. Melone & Mace, Judicial Review: The Usurpation and
Democracy Questions, 71 JUDICATURE 202, 203-04 (1988).
30. Thayer, supra note 27.
3 1. Melone & Mace, supra note 29, at 203-04.
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and legislative branches. 32 Lurton asserted that courts are the "guardi-
ans of the fundamental law which conducts and controls the otherwise
uncontrollable legislative power,"33 and there was little danger of
courts over-stepping that function and acting as legislatures.34
Louis Boudin, a prominent New York labor lawyer,35 challenged
Justice Lurton's theory of the historic validity of judicial review.36
Boudin maintained that even if the framers intended judicial review,
the Court should use self-restraint and not wield its power to deter-
mine policy issues in an unruled manner, a situation labeled "judicial
despotism. ' 37 Boudin asserted that the Court's "open assumption of
legislative discretion ' 38 in decisions such as Lochner v. New York 3
9
fulfilled Justice Clifford's fears of a despotism by the judiciary. 0
C. Incompatibility of Judicial Review with Democracy
The most persistent criticism of judicial review is that unfettered
power by a nonelected judiciary is inconsistent with democracy. The
argument maintains that judicial review conflicts with democratic
majority rule." Yet many defend judicial review as necessary to a
democracy because it can prevent a tyranny by the majority. This
32. Lurton, A Government of Law or a Government of Men?, 193 N. AM. REV. 9, 13-16
(1911); see Melone & Mace, supra note 29, at 204-05.
33. Lurton, supra note 32, at 24.
34. Id.
35. At the time, labor interests were opposed to active judicial review by the Court, as the
Court was then using theories such as substantive due process and liberty of contract to strike
legislation designed to protect workers. Melone & Mace, supra note 29, at 205.
36. Boudin, Government by Judiciary, 26 POL. SCI. Q. 238 (1911). This aspect of Boudin's
critique was challenged by Charles Beard, who analyzed speeches and writings by the framers
and concluded that most of the principal players at the Constitutional Convention favored
judicial review. Beard, The Supreme Court-Usurper or Grantee?, 27 POL. SC. Q. 1 (1912).
37. Boudin, supra note 36, at 262-64.
38. Id. at 269.
39. 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking legislation limiting work hours in the name of "substantive
due process"). The Lochner opinion has become symbolic of the Court's "noninterpretive" mode
of constitutional analysis. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703,
710-14 (1975).
40. Courts cannot nullify an act of the state legislature on the vague ground that they think
it opposed to a general latent spirit supposed to pervade or underlie the Constitution, where
neither the terms nor the implications of the instrument disclose any such restriction. Such
a power is denied to the courts, because to concede it would be to make the courts sovereign
over both the constitution and the people, and convert the government into a judicial
despotism.
Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655, 699 (1874) (Clifford, J., dissenting), quoted in
Boudin, supra note 36, at 262.
41. Choper, The Supreme Court and the Political Branches: Democratic Theory and Practice,
122 U. PA. L. REV. 810, 815 (1974); see also J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE
NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1980).
Washington Law Review
defense is premised on the realization that majority rule is only one
aspect of America's constitutional democracy. Individual liberties and
the rights of the minority are equally important.42 Professor Eugene
Rostow argues that judicial review "is implicit in the conception of a
written Constitution delegating limited powers."43
Professor William Bishin has summarized the argument that judi-
cial review is consistent with democratic theory.' He first emphasizes
that the American system of constitutional democracy is not entirely
based on principles of majoritarianism. Thus, judicial review can be
seen as just another facet of constitutional democracy-such as consti-
tutional limitations on who may serve as president, and the super-
majorities required for some legislative action-that is not strictly
majoritarian, but instead acts to restrict the majority.45 Bishin notes
that strict majoritarianism can take on characteristics of a tyranny,46
and the judicial branch is the appropriate agency to limit the major-
ity's power.47 An important aspect of American conceptions of
democracy is the promotion of individual freedoms. Because giving
total freedom to one person means taking it away from another, there
must be a legitimate, authoritative statement of values, such as the
Constitution, to determine rights to competing freedoms.4" The courts
can and should interpret the vague language of the Constitution, as
well as develop constitutional doctrine based on accepted values of
society and other objective evidence of meaning from the Constitu-
tion's text and organization.4 9
Some recent commentators attempt, as did Thayer, to resolve the
tension between judicial review and democratic (majoritarian) princi-
ples. These commentators accept only strictly constrained judicial
review.5" Professor John Ely argues that the democracy-aiding func-
tion of judicial review is promoted only where the offending legislation
interferes with an open political process."1 Under this view, judicial
review becomes wholly illegitimate where the Court would impose its
42. Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARV. L. REV. 193, 195
(1952).
43. Id.
44. Bishin, Judicial Review in Democratic Theory, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 1099 (1977).
45. Id. at 1108-12.
46. Id. at 1112-17.
47. Id. at 1117-18.
48. Id. at 1113.
49. Id. at 1134-35.
50. See, e.g., J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIsTRUsT (1980); Meese, The Attorney General's
View, supra note 10; Bork, supra note 12.
51. J. ELY, supra note 50.
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own values in derogation of the majority's as voted through the legis-
lature.5" Other commentators challenge this policy of so constraining
the judiciary, arguing that it would inhibit the quality of decisions."
The judiciary is in a unique position to protect fundamental consti-
tutional principles threatened by ill-conceived legislation. Nonethe-
less, courts and commentators supporting this function must consider
the complaints against the institution. Those complaints assert that
allowing unelected judges the unfettered power to overturn the will of
the people, without any meaningful recourse by the people to reverse
such actions, violates democratic principles.
The debate about the role of judicial review in a constitutional
democracy has largely taken place on the federal stage. Moving the
debate to the state arena significantly changes the issues. Several
aspects of state court decision-making make judicial review seem less
threatening. Decisions by state courts affect only the individual states;
the scope of the decisions is much smaller than that of the United
States Supreme Court's decisions. The United States Supreme Court
may also review many state court decisions. Those decisions not
within the Supreme Court's jurisdiction may be modified through
changes in state statutes or by amendments to state constitutions.
Finally, most state judges are more democratically accountable
through judicial elections than their federal counterparts.
II. STATE JUDICIAL ACTIVISM
Recent developments in state court jurisprudence bring the proper
scope of state judicial review into public debate with a frequency
approaching that of the United States Supreme Court. The last decade
and a half has seen a marked increase in state courts independently
interpreting their state constitutions. At last count more than 450
published state court opinions interpret state constitutions as going
beyond federal constitutional guarantees.5" A plethora of law review
52. Id.
53. Berch, An Essay on the Role of the Supreme Court in the Adjudication of Constitutional
Rights, 1984 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 283; Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies
and Judicial Legitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635 (1982); Lusky, "Government by Judiciary" What
Price Legitimacy?, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 403 (1979); Satter, Changing Roles of Courts and
Legislatures, 85 CASE & COM. 18 (July-Aug. 1980).
54. Galie, State Supreme Courts, Judicial Federalism and the Other Constitutions, 71
JUDICATURE 100, 100-01 (1987); Wermiel, Asserting Rights: State Supreme Courts Are Feeling
Their Oats About CivilLiberties, Wall St. J., June 15, 1988, at Al, col. 1;see also Collins & Galie,
Models of Post-Incorporation Judicial Review: 1985 Survey of State Constitutional Individual
Rights Decisions, 16 PUBLIUS 111 (Summer 1986), reprinted in 55 U. CIN. L. REv. 317, 317
(1986).
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articles commenting on the phenomenon has paralleled the growth of
state constitutional cases.55
A. Traditional State Constitutional Jurisprudence
Independent interpretation of state constitutions is not a novel phe-
nomenon. From the earliest stages of their histories, state courts have
relied on state constitutions, all of which have bills of rights similar to,
yet varying in some respects from, the federal Bill of Rights. In fact,
prior to the incorporation of most of the Bill of Rights under the four-
teenth amendment, the first ten federal amendments explicitly were
held inapplicable to the states.56 Thus, state courts "routinely
resolved constitutional issues without reference to the federal constitu-
tion."57 The state courts' right and obligation to rely on and interpret
their constitutions was stated in 1855 by Justice Smith of the Wiscon-
sin Supreme Court:
The people ... made this constitution, and adopted it as their primary
law. The people of other states made for themselves respectively consti-
tutions which are construed by their own appropriate functionaries. Let
them construe theirs-let us construe and stand by ours. 58
In many instances state constitutional decisions preceded analysis of
individual rights under the United States Constitution. For example,
state courts developed the exclusionary rule,59 which was later
55. See Collins, Galie & Kincaid, State High Courts, State Constitutions, and Individual
Rights Litigation Since 1980: A Judicial Survey, 16 PUBLIUS 141 (Summer 1986), reprinted in 13
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 599, 599 (1986).
56. The Constitution was ordained and established by the people of the United States for
themselves, for their own government, and not for the government of the individual States.
Each State established a constitution for itself, and in that constitution provided such
limitations and restrictions on the powers of its particular government as its judgment
dictated.... [The limitations in the federal Constitution] are limitations of power granted in
the instrument itself; not of distinct governments, framed by different persons for different
purposes.
Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247 (1833); see also Project Report: Toward
an Activist Role for State Bills of Rights, 8 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 271, 275-83 (1973) [herein-
after Project Report].
57. Abrahamson, Criminal Law and State 'Constitutions: The Emergence of State
Constitutional Law, 63 TEx. L. REV. 1141, 1144 (1985); see also Abrahamson & Gutmann, The
New Federalism: State Constitutions and State Courts, 71 JUDICATURE 88, 96 (1987); Brennan,
State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 501-02
(1977). For a history of the early constitutions, see Shapiro, State Constitutional Doctrine and
the Criminal Process, 16 SETON HALL L. REV. 630 (1986); Note, Developments in the Law-The
Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1324 (1982).
58. Attorney Gen. ex rel. Bashford v. Barstow, 4 Wis. 567, 758 (1855), quoted in
Abrahamson, Homegrown Justice: The State Constitutions, in DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 306, 312 (B. McGraw ed. 1985).
59. The exclusionary rule prohibits the use, in a criminal trial, of evidence obtained in
violation of the defendant's constitutional rights.
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adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Weeks v. United
States60 and applied to the state courts after several states had already
adopted it.6 Gideon v. Wainwright,62 which guaranteed indigent crim-
inal defendants counsel at public expense, followed more than 100
years of state constitutional jurisprudence, and has been characterized
as bringing "only a few laggard states into line."63 The federal Bill of
Rights, of course, was based largely on already existing state
constitutions."
In the 1960's, the Warren Court held that most of the federal Bill of
Rights applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment. The
Court also gave a broader interpretation of those rights than had been
applied by most states through their own constitutions. This develop-
ment reversed the traditional roles of the state and federal courts, for
the first time giving the federal Constitution the primary role in pro-
tecting most individual rights.65 After the consequent period of rela-
tive dormancy of state constitutional rights, in the late 1970's and
1980's state courts began to reaffirm their traditional function as the
primary protectors and interpreters of those rights.
B. "New Federalism"
When Warren Burger replaced Earl Warren as Chief Justice, there
began a gradual retrenchment of several key Supreme Court cases
interpreting the United States Constitution to protect certain individ-
ual liberties and rights. These changes ushered in a resurgence of
interest in state constitutions as protectors of those rights that had
been nurtured by the Warren Court. This movement is sometimes
referred to as the "new federalism."
66
60. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
61. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); see People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905
(1955); State v. Sheridan, 121 Iowa 164, 96 N.W. 730 (1903), rev'd, State v. Tonn, 195 Iowa 94,
191 N.W. 530 (1923); Project Report, supra note 56, at 322-50 (appendix listing states that
adopted exclusionary rule and right to counsel before required by United States Supreme Court
cases).
62. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
63. Abrahamson & Gutmann, supra note 57, at 95; see also Project Report, supra note 56, at
322-50.
64. Brennan, supra note 57, at 501.
65. Project Report, supra note 56, at 275-84; see also Abrahamson, supra note 57, at 1147;
Note, supra note 57, at 1328.
66. See, eg., Wilkes, The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure in 1984: Death of the
Phoenix? in DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 166, 166 (B. McGraw ed. 1985);
Abrahamson & Gutmann, supra note 57, at 88.
Professor Collins views the new federalism in structural terms, "federalism entails the notion
that proper respect be accorded to state institutions performing those separate functions
Washington Law Review
In 1977, Justice William Brennan published a law review article
reflecting the state constitutional renaissance.67 Justice Brennan recog-
nized the trend of state courts construing state constitutional counter-
parts of the Bill of Rights as guaranteeing state citizens more
protection than the federal constitution. 6' He supported this develop-
ment and encouraged the bar to raise state constitutional questions
before state courts.6 9 Justice Brennan's thesis explains that state law
can supplement federal minimums. He stated recently in a lecture at
New York University that the Court's present "contraction of federal
rights and remedies" under the United States Constitution "mandates
the assumption of a more responsible state court role."7
Beyond merely reacting to recent Supreme Court doctrine, several
commentators advance another rationale for state courts resolving
cases under their state constitutions before turning to the federal Con-
stitution. These commentators maintain that such an approach better
fulfills the state constitution's traditional role as primary protector of
individual liberties and better serves principles of federalism.7' An
increasing number of state courts are following this approach. 2
C. State Court Independent Analysis
State court independent interpretation of state constitutions often
receives its impetus when the United States Supreme Court overrules
or minimizes its own previous bright line rules for criminal defend-
ants' rights. State courts often choose to reject the newer stance of the
associated with the concept of sovereignty." Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions-Away
From a Reactionary Approach, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 5 (1981).
Justice Hugo Black described federalism as:
[A] proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is
made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the
National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform
their separate functions in their separate ways.
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971); see also Project Report, supra note 56, at 285-86.
67. Brennan, supra note 57, at 489.
68. Id. at 495, 502.
69. Id. at 502.
70. Brennan, The Bill of Rights: State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 59
N.Y. ST. B.J. 10, 17 (May 1987).
71. See, e.g., Galie, supra note 54; Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bills of
Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REV. 379 (1980); Comment, The Primacy Method of State Constitutional
Decisionmaking: Interpreting the Maine Constitution, 38 ME. L. REv. 491 (1986).
72. See State v. Cadman, 476 A.2d 1148 (Me. 1984); State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 471 A.2d
347 (1983); Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers v. Board of Educ., 70 N.Y.2d 57, 510
N.E.2d 325, 517 N.Y.S.2d 456 (1987); Hewitt v. State Accident Ins. Fund Corp., 294 Or. 33, 653
P.2d 970 (1982); State v. Jewett, 146 Vt. 221, 500 A.2d 233 (1985); State v. Coe, 101 Wash. 2d
364, 679 P.2d 353 (1984); see also Galie, supra note 54, at 103.
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Court, especially where the prior bright line rule has become an estab-
lished norm for state law enforcement. The state courts cite their own
constitutions as the justification for declining to follow the Supreme
Court's retrenchment from the prior rule.7 3
One example of this phenomenon can be traced to the 1960's, when
the Supreme Court established a bright line rule to determine if infor-
mation provided by an informant was sufficiently reliable to provide
the basis of a warrant.7' The test, commonly known as the "Aguilar-
Spinelli test," was set forth in Aguilar v. Texas75 and Spinelli v. United
States.76 Under Aguilar-Spinelli, information provided to police by a
confidential informant may form the basis of a warrant only if it satis-
fies a two-prong test. The first prong, basis of knowledge, requires the
police to reveal the informant's source of information. The second
prong, veracity, requires the police to show proof of the informant's
credibility or reliability. Courts and commentators have recognized
that the two prongs of the Aguilar-Spinelli test protect fourth amend-
ment rights. 7
In 1983, the Court rejected Aguilar-Spinelli in favor of a "totality-
of-the-circumstances" test in Illinois v. Gates.78 Under Gates, magis-
trates need not specifically satisfy either the basis of knowledge or the
veracity prong, but need only weigh the informant's information and
"make a practical, common-sense decision."' 79 The Gates test provides
considerably less protection to criminal suspects than Aguilar-Spinelli.
Despite the Court's finding that its previous rule impeded law
enforcement, currently five state courts explicitly reject the Gates test
73. See Brennan, supra note 70; Williams, In the Supreme Court's Shadow: Legitimacy of
State Rejection of Supreme Court Reasoning and Result, 35 S.C.L. REv. 353 (1984).
74. Other examples include reaction to the Court's retrenchment in Harris v. New York, 401
U.S. 222 (1971), of the fifth amendment right to warnings identified in Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966), and reaction to the Court's adoption of a good faith exception to the fourth
amendment exclusionary rule in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). Mosk, The
Emerging Agenda in State Constitutional Rights Law, 496 ANNALS 54 (Mar. 1988); Note, United
States v. Leon and Illinois v. Gates: A Call for State Courts to Develop State Constitutional Law,
1987 U. ILL. L. REv. 311; Note, Miranda and the State Constitution: State Courts Take a Stand,
39 VAND. L. REv. 1693, 1717-30 (1986).
75. 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
76. 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
77. The Aguilar test protects fourth amendment rights by requiring magistrates to verify
informant information, therefore insuring that magistrates only issue warrants supported by
reliable information. The Aguilar test also protects fourth amendment rights by providing a
bright-line standard, thus insuring that magistrates will follow the test because it is easily
understood and easily applied.
Note, supra note 74, at 321.
78. 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
79. Id. at 238.
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in favor of the bright-line rule of Aguilar-Spinelli.8" A number of
states, on the other hand, have declined to establish a rule differing
from Gates." In the states that rejected Gates, the Aguilar-Spinelli
test's clear law enforcement guidelines and ensurance of informant
information reliability have proved to be a major impetus in its reten-
tion. 2 A second factor leading states to retain Aguilar-Spinelli is that
many state courts realize that blindly following the Supreme Court in
its advance and retreat from individual rights is undesirable where the
state high courts have already based holdings on a prior rule. 3
The decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Com-
monwealth v. Upton (Upton H)84 typifies the development of state
courts independently interpreting state constitutions. The Massachu-
setts court had originally decided the case under the United States
Constitution and had applied the newly announced Gates rule." But
the Massachusetts court did not interpret the Gates opinion as
"decreeing a standardless 'totality of the circumstances' test." 6 How-
ever, because the Supreme Court had in fact intended Gates to
80. State v. Kimbro, 197 Conn. 219, 496 A.2d 498, 507 (1985); Commonwealth v. Upton, 394
Mass. 363, 476 N.E.2d 548, 556-58 (1985); People v. Johnson, 66 N.Y.2d 398, 488 N.E.2d 439,
444-45, 497 N.Y.S.2d 618, 623-24 (1985); State v. Jackson, 102 Wash. 2d 432, 439-43, 688 P.2d
136, 138-43 (1984); Note, supra note 74; see also Note, Closing the Gates: A Nebraska
Constitutional Standard for Search and Seizure, 63 NEB. L. REV. 514, 565 (1984).
81. Thompson v. State, 280 Ark. 265, 658 S.W.2d 350, 352 (1983); People v. Pannebaker, 714
P.2d 904, 907 (Colo. 1986); State v. Johnson, 110 Idaho 516, 716 P.2d 1288, 1299 (1986); State v.
Lang, 105 Idaho 683, 672 P.2d 561, 561-62 (1983); People v. Tisler, 103 111. 2d 226, 469 N.E.2d
147, 157-58 (1984); State v. Rose, 8 Kan. App. 2d 659, 665 P.2d 1111, 1113- 15 (1983); Beemer
v. Commonwealth, 665 S.W.2d 912, 915 (Ky. 1984); Potts v. State, 300 Md. 567, 479 A.2d 1335,
1339 (1984); Lee v. State, 435 So. 2d 674 (Miss. 1983); State v. Arrington, 311 N.C. 633, 319
S.E.2d 254, 259 (1984); Commonwealth v. Gray, 509 Pa. 476, 503 A.2d 921, 926 (1985); State v.
Adkins, 346 S.E.2d 762, 773 (W. Va. 1986); Bonsness v. State, 672 P.2d 1291, 1293 (Wyo. 1983).
82. "The Aguilar-Spinelli two-pronged inquiry has proven a satisfactory method of providing
reasonable assurance that probable cause determinations are based on information derived from
a credible source with firsthand information, and we are not convinced that the Gates test offers a
satisfactory alternative." People v. Griminger, 71 N.Y.2d 635, 524 N.E.2d 409, 411, 529
N.Y.S.2d 55, 57 (1988); see also State v. Jackson, 102 Wash. 2d 432, 436-38, 688 P.2d 136,
139-40 (1984).
83. In the present case, the State asks us to reject ... established jurisprudence [based on
the Aguilar-Spinelli test] and follow, blindly, the lead of the United States Supreme Court.
This we are neither required nor inclined to do.
Prior reliance on federal precedent and federal constitutional provisions do not preclude
us from taking a more expansive view of [Washington] Const. art. I, § 7, where the United
States Supreme Court determines to further limit federal guaranties in a manner inconsistent
with our prior pronouncements.
State v. Jackson, 102 Wash. 2d 432, 438-39, 688 P.2d 136, 140- 41 (1984); see also State v. Lang,
105 Idaho 683, 672 P.2d 561, 569 (1983) (Bistline, J., dissenting) (criticizing Idaho court for
being "a satellite in the eccentric orbiting of the High Court").
84. 394 Mass. 363, 476 N.E.2d 548 (1985).
85. Commonwealth v. Upton (Upton 1), 390 Mass. 562, 458 N.E.2d 717 (1983).
86. Id. at 721.
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announce such a test, it overruled the Massachusetts opinion in Mas-
sachusetts v. Upton.8 7 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court on
remand concluded that the Massachusetts Constitution provides the
protections of the Aguilar-Spinelli test.88 In reaching that conclusion,
the Massachusetts court asserted its historical justification for diverg-
ing from the federal analysis:
The Constitution of the Commonwealth preceded and is independent of
the Constitution of the United States. In fact, portions of the Constitu-
tion of the United States are based on provisions in the Constitution of
the Commonwealth, and this has been thought to be particularly true of
the relationship between the Fourth Amendment and [Massachusetts
Constitution] art. 14.... In particular situations, on similar facts, we
have reached different results under the State Constitution from those
that were reached by the Supreme Court of the United States under the
Federal Constitution. On occasion, the differences can be explained
because of different language in the two Constitutions.... On the other
hand, in deciding similar constitutional questions, the two courts have
reached contrary results based on differences of opinion concerning the
application of similar constitutional principles.89
Ultimately, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court remained loyal
to the Aguilar-Spinelli test because it was convinced that this rule pro-
vided better protections to criminally accused and a better guide to
law enforcement than Gates.90
As with the Washington Supreme Court in State v. Jackson,91 the
Massachusetts court noted that Aguilar-Spinelli worked in practice;
therefore it did not accept the United States Supreme Court's reason-
ing in rejecting that test.92 With the exception of California, 9 in none
of the states rejecting the Gates test has the electorate or legislature
amended the state constitution to return the state to the federal
standard.
87. 466 U.S. 727 (1984).
88. Commonwealth v. Upton (Upton I1), 394 Mass. 363, 476 N.E.2d 548 (1985).
89. Upton II, 476 N.E.2d at 555 (1985) (citations omitted).
90. We reject the "totality of the circumstances" test now espoused by a majority of the
United States Supreme Court. That standard is flexible, but is also "unacceptably shapeless
and permissive."... The Federal test lacks the precision that we believe can and should be
articulated in stating a test for determining probable cause.
Ia at 556 (citation omitted).
91. 102 Wash. 2d 432, 436-38, 688 P.2d 136, 139-40 (1984).
92. Upton I1, 476 N.E.2d at 557; see also State v. Jones, 706 P.2d 317, 321-24 (Alaska 1985)
(rebutting six propositions on which the United States Supreme Court justified its rejection of the
Aguilar-Spinelli test).
93. Voters in California passed a ballot initiative generally allowing admission of evidence
that meets federal constitutional requirements. See infra note 135 and accompanying text.
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III. DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMATION OF STATE
COURT ACTIONS
A. State Systems and Democratic Accountability
Criticism of judicial review by the United States Supreme Court for
being undemocratic rests largely on the practical impossibility of over-
turning an unpopular decision and the recognition that federal justices
are appointed for life.94 Of the 5000 amendments to the United States
Constitution introduced in Congress,95 only twenty-six have passed
under the stringent procedures of Article V.96 Few successful consti-
tutional amendments have been in response to unpopular United
States Supreme Court decisions.97 Professor Eugene Rostow has
pointed out, however, that independent constitutional review by the
judiciary is legitimized by the power and final responsibility of the peo-
ple to amend the constitution.98
State court decisions are dramatically more vulnerable to demo-
cratic influences. In the majority of states, justices99 are either elected
initially or citizens vote periodically on the retention of appointed jus-
tices. °° Most states adopted popular election of the judiciary in the
94. United States Supreme Court justices are appointed by the President, subject to approval
by the Senate. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. The term of office of federal judges is for life,
"during good Behavior." Id. art. III, § 1. Thus, it is impossible to vote a United States Supreme
Court justice out of office because of unpopular decisions interpreting the Constitution.
95. Dellinger, The Legitimacy of Constitutional Change: Rethinking the Amendment Process;
97 HARV. L. REv. 386, 427 (1983).
96. U.S. CONST. art. V provides in relevant part:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose
Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of
the several states, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case,
shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the
Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths
thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress.
97. J. CHOPER, supra note 41, at 49; Dellinger, supra note 95, at 414-15 (1983). Franklin D.
Roosevelt rejected the use of a constitutional amendment to ensure the constitutionality of his
New Deal program, despite his huge margin of victory in his 1936 election to the presidency, and
instead sought to gain this result through an attempt to pack the Court. Id. at 429-30.
The eleventh amendment stands as a rare example of Congress seeking to alter Supreme Court
constitutional jurisprudence. Specifically meant to overturn Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.)
419 (1793), early versions of the amendment were proposed in Congress within three days after
the decision's announcement. See P. Low & J. JEFFRIES, FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF
FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS 773-74 (1987).
98. Rostow, supra note 42, at 197-98; see also Fisher, Ballot Propositions: The Challenge of
Direct Democracy to State Constitutional Jurisprudence, 11 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 43, 89 n.225
(1983).
99. I use the term "justice" to refer to a judge on a state court of last resort. Much of my
discussion, however, might also apply to lower state court judges.
100. THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 157-73 (1988-89
ed.) [hereinafter THE BOOK OF STATES].
State Constitutional Law and Democratic Accountability
mid- to late nineteenth century, seeing it as a means to reinforce the
credibility of judicial decision-making. 101 Although judicial positions
are typically more secure in length of term than those of the state leg-
islature, state judges generally are more answerable to the democratic
process than their federal counterparts.10 2
Another democratic check on state judicial review is the amend-
ment of state constitutions. Although procedures vary from state to
state, it is generally much simpler to amend a state's constitution than
it would be to amend the Constitution of the United States. 103 The
current state constitutions have been amended more than 5300
times. 1°4 Most may be amended by a majority of the popular vote
ratifying a proposal which has passed the legislature. 105  In some
states, a state constitutional amendment may have its inception in a
popular initiative followed by a referendum vote.10 6 It is also simpler
for states to call constitutional conventions, and some have done so
several times.' 07 Constitutional amendment has been the most impor-
tant electoral check on state court interpretation.10 8
The two democratic checks on the state judiciary just mentioned are
virtually nonexistent at the federal level. Some commentators feel that
these checks diffuse the criticism that active judicial review is illegiti-
mate simply because it is antithetical to the democratic principles.' 0 9
To put it more positively, state opinions interpreting state constitu-
tions may be more democratically legitimate than their federal
counterparts.
101. Hall, Progressive Reform and the Decline of Democratic Accountability: The Popular
Election of State Supreme Court Judges, 1850-1920, 1984 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 345, 346-47.
102. Besides the election process, Professor Robert Thompson has identified three different
types of "accountability" of judges: Accountability by review by a higher court, accountability
through opinion writing, and accountability to a commission or special tribunal. Thompson,
Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability, Judicial Elections, and the California Supreme
Court: Defining the Terms of the Debate, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 809, 837-39 (1986). In addition to
the "discipline impartiality" served by opinion writing, the process of stating reasons for
decisions can inform the voters of a justice's approach and philosophy. Id. at 838.
103. See Fischer, supra note 98, at 46-47.
104. Kincaid, State Constitutions in the Federal System, 496 ANNALS 12, 14 (Mar. 1988).
105. THE BOOK OF THE STATES, supra note 100, at 16-17. Legislatures may present a state
constitutional proposal to the general electorate after approving the measure by a vote ranging
from a simple majority to a two-thirds majority. Id.
106. Id. at 18.
107. Id. at 2-3, 19-20.
108. Wilkes, First Things Last: Amendomania and State Bills of Rights, 54 Miss. L.J. 223, 233
(1984) (state constitutional amendments limiting procedural rights in crirninal cases).
109. Eg., Galie, supra note 54, at 108-09.
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B. Examples of Democratic Input to State Jurisprudence
The potential exists for state citizens and legislatures to use the pow-
ers granted by their constitutions to check the power of their judiciary.
In most states where courts have reached different results than the
United States Supreme Court on similar facts, no change in the state
constitution resulted. On a few, well publicized occasions, there have
been strong reactions.
1. Amendment
Oregon voters, after seeing a steady stream of Oregon cases rely
upon the state constitution to afford protection to the criminally
accused, recently defeated a measure similar to the California "Vic-
tims' Bill of Rights."' 0 The measure would have amended or
repealed statutes more protective of rights of the criminally accused
than required by the United States Constitution.' The Oregon
Supreme Court is entitled to consider the defeat of this measure a
democratic legitimation of much of its independent state constitu-
tional analysis.
In the area of search and seizure, Washington also has developed a
line of cases that interprets the privacy clause of the Washington Con-
stitution differently from the United States Supreme Court's interpre-
tation of the fourth amendment." 2 It is now established that article I,
section 7 of the Washington Constitution provides greater protection
110. See infra text accompanying notes 134-36.
111. Collins, The New Federalism is Thriving Despite Setbacks and Losses in 1984, NAT'L
L.J., Apr. 29, 1985, at 32; Wells v. Paulus, 296 Or. 338, 675 P.2d 482 (1984) (summarizing
provisions of the ballot measure).
112. The texts of the Washington state and federal constitutional provisions prohibiting
illegal searches and seizures differ significantly. The fourth amendment to the United States
Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV.
Article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution provides: "No person shall be disturbed in
his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law." Wash. Const. art. I, § 7. The
earlier "new federalism" cases that give independent meaning to the Washington Constitution's
independent language are: State v. Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d 686, 700-01, 674 P.2d 1240, 1248
(1983) (search incident to arrest requires exigency; no general "automobile exception" under
Washington constitution), overruled in part State v. Stroud, 106 Wash. 2d 144, 150-53, 720 P.2d
436, 440--41 (1986); State v. White, 97 Wash. 2d 92, 110, 640 P.2d 1061, 1071 (1982) (privacy
rights are paramount concern of art. I, § 7 of Washington Constitution); State v. Simpson, 95
Wash. 2d 170, 179-81, 622 P.2d 1199, 1205-06 (1980) (automatic standing under Washington
Constitution).
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against warrantless searches and seizures than does the fourth amend-
ment. 1 3 In 1985, the Washington Attorney General requested the
Washington Legislature to introduce a state constitutional amendment
requiring state courts to apply current federal court analysis to search
and seizure cases.' 14 That measure met defeat in both houses of the
Washington Legislature." 5 Thereafter the Washington Supreme
Court continued to interpret the state constitution as providing more
protections than its federal counterpart." 6
Newspaper editorials often indicate the range of citizen opinion on
constitutional cases. 1'7 The Hawaiian press reaction to the Hawaii
Supreme Court's decision in State v. Kam, "' finding the sale of
obscene materials protected by the privacy guarantee of the Hawaii
Constitution, serves as an example. The commentary ranged from
acclaim of the decision as "a victory for civil liberties that should not
threaten . . . community morality,"'1 9 to its condemnation as "a
major setback in the battle against pornography."1 20 Such mixed sig-
nals may reflect a lack of public consensus on the issue. Thus, where
an important state court decision interprets the state constitution to
provide more protection than its federal counterpart, the absence of
negative commentary is significant.
113. See, eg., State v. Stroud, 106 Wash. 2d 144, 148-50, 720 P.2d 436, 439 (1986); State v.
Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d 170, 177-79, 622 P.2d 1199, 1204-05 (1980).
114. H.J. Res. 11, 49th Sess., 1985 Regular Sess., Wash. Legis. Bills 1985-86; S.J. Res. 119,
49th Sess., 1985 Regular Sess., Wash. Legis. Bills 1985-86.
115. H. Journal, 49th Sess., 1985 Regular Sess., at 109, 2396; S. Journal, 49th Sess., 1985
Regular Sess., at 228, 2418.
116. Seattle v. Mesiani, 110 Wash. 2d 454, 457, 755 P.2d 775, 777 (1988) (holding there is no
diminished expectation of privacy in automobiles; sobriety checkpoints without authority of law
violate Washington Constitution); State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d 54, 68, 720 P.2d 808, 816
(1986) (obtaining telephone records without a warrant violates Washington Constitution); State
v. Stroud, 106 Wash. 2d 144, 152, 720 P.2d 436, 441 (1986) (search incident to arrest does not
extend to locked containers in automobiles); State v. Myrick, 102 Wash. 2d 506, 513, 688 P.2d
151, 153-54 (1984) (Washington Constitution protects privacy itself, not merely an "expectation
of privacy"); State v. Chrisman, 100 Wash. 2d 814, 821, 676 P.2d 419, 424 (1984) (warrantless
search of dormitory room following misdemeanor arrest violates Washington Constitution). But
see State v. Stroud, 106 Wash. 2d 144, 150, 720 P.2d 436, 440 (1986) (overruling in part and
retreating from some of the analysis in State v. Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d 686, 674 P.2d 1240 (1983)).
117. The most recent of Washington's privacy cases was a decision interpreting the privacy
provision of the Washington Constitution as prohibiting a police program of warrantless road
blocks against drunk drivers. Seattle v. Mesiani, 110 Wash. 2d 454, 755 P.2d 775 (1988).
Although that police program inspired intense debate during its duration, the opinion
invalidating the program received uniformly favorable editorial reactions. E.g., Anacortes Am.,
May 25, 1988, at 4, col. 1; The Olympian, May 18, 1988, at 9A, col. 1; The Seattle Times, May
16, 1988, at AlO, col. 1.
118. - Haw. __, 748 P.2d 372 (1988).
119. Honolulu Advertiser, Jan. 11, 1988, at A6, col. 1.
120. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, Jan. 12, 1988, at A16, col. 1.
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Across the country there are other indications of popular accept-
ance of "new federalism," or at least popular acquiescence in the new
directions charted by state courts. Rhode Island voters recently reaf-
firmed "new federalism" by amending their constitution to state that
the individual rights it protects "stand independent of the U.S.
Constitution." 1 21
Professor Donald Wilkes lists nineteen important amendments to
state bills of rights between 1970 and 1984.122 In addition, in 1987
Professor Janice C. May surveyed constitutional amendment and revi-
sion in the states. 23 This research shows that with certain notable
exceptions, the amendments do not relate to the new federalism deci-
sions, but rather to clear provisions in the state constitutions. Profes-
sor May noted: "Compared with other articles of state constitutions,
the bill of rights is the target of fewer changes than the other substan-
tive provisions .... The relatively small number of proposals reen-
forces the observation made in the preceding pages that state bills of
rights have not been changed a great deal."1 24 In fact, May concluded
that if the amendment process is viewed from 1970 to 1985, including
the bills of rights of new constitutions adopted since 1970, then the
scales are tipped toward overall support of rights beyond those
required by the federal Constitution. 25 The overwhelming majority
of the 300 new' federalism decisions listed as of 1986126 have not
inspired any state constitutional amendment.
Twelve of the nineteen amendments listed by Professor Wilkes dealt
with preventative detention. The ten states 27 enacting the twelve pre-
ventative detention amendments had constitutional provisions guaran-
teeing the right to bail.' 28 Part of the motive for these constitutional
amendments may have been state court interpretations of right-to-bail
121. THE BOOK OF THE STATES, supra note 100, at 5.
122. Wilkes, supra note 108, at 233-35.
123. May, Constitutional Amendment and Revision Revisited, 17 PUBLIUS 153 (Winter 1987).
It is interesting to compare the relatively small lists of state constitutional amendments
relating to individual rights contained in these two articles with the list of new federalism cases
compiled by Professor Ronald Collins in 1986. Collins, Looking to the States, NAT'L L.J. Sept.
29, 1986, at S-I, S-9-14.
124. May, supra note 123, at 171.
125. Id. at 174-75.
126. Collins, supra note 123, at S-9-14. Collins counts more than 450 such decisions as of
1988. See Wermiel, supra note 54, at Al, col. 1.
127. Arizona amended the bail provision of its constitution in both 1970 and 1982. ARIZ.
CONST. art. II, § 22. In 1982 California amended its constitution through Proposition 4 and the
"Victims' Bill of Rights," both of which allow preventative detention. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 12.
The remaining eight states are Florida, Michigan, Nebraska, New Mexico, Texas, Utah,
Vermont, and Wisconsin. See Wilkes, supra note 108, at 248 & n.127.
128. See Wilkes, supra note 108, at 247.
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provisions. 129 Nonetheless, no strong correlation exists between a
court decision interpreting the right-to-bail provision to prohibit pre-
ventative detention and the enactment of an amendment. In fact,
most of the states whose courts did issue rulings on the right to bail as
prohibiting preventative detention did not react by amending their
constitutions. 130
In contrast, the citizens of a few states have reacted to state court
decisions by enacting limiting constitutional amendments. Although
not all of the recent cases interpreting state constitutions are in the
area of criminal rights, the amendment process has largely targeted
those cases. Criminal justice, as these amendments attest, ranks high
as a voter concern.
1 3 1
State court decisions on the death penalty and the exclusion of evi-
dence admissible under the federal Constitutiton have inspired a few
organized responses to amend state constitutions. In two of the states
whose courts found the death penalty unconstitutional under the state
constitution, voters passed constitutional amendments reinstating the
penalty. 132 In California, the very date of the decision finding the
death penalty unconstitutional is preserved in the language of the
amendment reinstating it, a perpetual reminder to the courts of the
consequences of straying too far from the popular will. 133
In 1982, in response to several court rulings favorable to criminal
defendants, California voters passed "Proposition 8," known as the
"Victims' Bill of Rights." One provision amended the California Con-
stitution to admit in criminal trials and proceedings evidence obtained
in violation of state constitutional rights or laws. 134 With the excep-
tion of evidence rules excluded from its scope, 135 the amendment man-
dates adherence to federal constitutional guidelines as the only
129. E.g., In re Underwood, 9 Cal. 3d 345, 508 P.2d 721, 107 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1973); State v.
Pray, 133 Vt. 537, 346 A.2d 227, 230 (1975) ("If the constitutional guarantees of bail.., are in
error, then it is up to the people to effect change, since the right to amend the constitution rests
solely with the electorate.").
130. E.g., Martin v. State, 517 P.2d 1389 (Alaska 1974); Palmer v. District Court, 156 Colo.
284, 398 P.2d 435 (1965); State v. Pett, 253 Minn. 429, 92 N.W.2d 205 (1958); State v. Johnson,
61 N.J. 351, 294 A.2d 245 (1972); Commonwealth v. Truesdale, 449 Pa. 325, 296 A.2d 829
(1972).
131. Fisher, supra note 98; Wilkes, supra note 66.
132. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 27 (passed in 1972 in response to People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d
628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972)); MASS. CONST. pt. I,
art. 26 (passed in 1982 in response to District Attorney v. Watson, 381 Mass. 648, 411 N.E.2d
1274 (1980)); Wilkes, supra note 66, at 180-81; Wilkes, supra note 108.
133. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 27.
134. Id. at § 28(d).
135. Existing evidentiary rules regarding privilege or hearsay are still in effect. Id.
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standard to determine the admissibility of evidence acquired during
police searches. The Victims' Bill of Rights is a major victory by a
"law and order faction of the extreme right" '136 against the advance of
"new federalism" in California.
Voters in Florida also passed an initiative amending the Florida
Constitution to prevent evidence admissible under the federal Consti-
tution from being excluded under the state's search and seizure provi-
sion. 37 The Florida amendment is notable in that Chief Justice
Burger specifically applauded it in his concurrence to the dismissal of
certiorari in Florida v. Casal. 138 Chief Justice Burger's statement, with
its implication that the Supreme Court has a monopoly on constitu-
tional interpretation leading to "rational" law enforcement, did not sit
comfortably with proponents of new federalism. 139 The concurrence
in Casal is also difficult to reconcile with the Chief Justice's dissent in
Crist v. Bretz, " in which he stated: "We should be cautious about
constitutionalizing every procedural device found useful in federal
courts, thereby foreclosing the States from experimentation with dif-
ferent approaches which are equally compatible with constitutional
principles."' 4 1
136. Wilkes, supra note 66, at 172.
137. "Articles or information obtained in violation of this right shall not be admissible in
evidence if such articles or information would be inadmissible under the decisions of the United
States Supreme Court construing the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution." FLA.
CONST. art. I, § 12. Professor Ronald Collins has pointed out that, as with many amendments
that attempt to alter constitutional jurisprudence, the amendment reflects inexperienced drafting.
Collins, Government by Popular Initiative: States Amend Their Constitutions, NAT'L L.J., June
18, 1984, at 14, col. 1.
138. 462 U.S. 637 (1982) (writ of certiorari dismissed as improvidently granted). The Chief
Justice wrote:
The people of Florida have . . . shown acute awareness of the means to prevent . . .
inconsistent interpretations of the [federal and state] constitutional provisions.
With our dual system of state and federal laws, administered by parallel state and federal
courts, different standards may arise in various areas. But when state courts interpret state
law to require more than the Federal Constitution requires, the citizens of the state must be
aware that they have the power to amend state law to ensure rational law enforcement.
Id. at 638-39 (Burger, C.J., concurring in dismissal of certiorari).
139. "Can this mean that the Chief Justice believes the Florida Supreme Court, or any state
court, engages in irrational behavior when it exercises its ancient and traditional power to extend
state constitutional protections beyond those secured by federal law?" Wilkes, supra note 108, at
246.
140. 437 U.S. 28 (1978).
141. Id. at 39 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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2 Election Challenges
Political action against individual justices has not been used as often
as attempts to amend state constitutions as a means of overturning
unpopular new federalism decisions. In most states where the courts
have been active in independently interpreting their constitutions,
neither the electorate nor the legislature has taken action against the
writing justice. However, in some circumstances a pattern of decisions
by one controversial justice has sufficiently focused the voter attention
necessary for a strong popular challenge. Some of these challenges
have removed the controversial judge from office; others have been
unsuccessful.
a. Rose Bird
California Governor Jerry Brown's appointment of Rose Bird as
Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court sparked continuing con-
troversy. In California, appellate judges are appointed by the gover-
nor and then are subject to retention votes at twelve year intervals. 42
From the start, the debate about Rose Bird centered on the political
aspects of her appointment as the first woman on California's high
court and as a liberal former member of Governor Jerry Brown's cabi-
net. 1 43 After her confirmation, she faced five unsuccessful recall cam-
paigns against her.
But in the 1986 retention election, Chief Justice Bird's opponents
focused on her rulings favorable to criminal defendants. 144 The great-
est controversy was her stance on the death sentence. During her term
as chief justice, the California Supreme Court overturned nearly every
death sentence it reviewed. Bird herself voted to overturn the capital
sentence or conviction in every capital case during her tenure.1 45 Bird
"emerged in the public's perception as the personal symbol of the lib-
eral proclivities of the court." 146 Rose Bird, as well as two other jus-
tices the voters identified with her, was ultimately defeated in her
retention election.
Justice Bird's defeat may be unique. Because of the extraordinary
political factors in her story, it is unlikely that Bird's experience is an
142. THE BOOK OF THE STATES, supra note 100, at 157, 163.
143. See P. STOLZ, JUDGING JUDGES-THE INVESTIGATION OF ROSE BIRD AND THE
CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT 7, 11-12 (1981).
144. Culver & Wold, Rose Bird and the Politics of Judicial Accountability in California, 70
JUDICATURE 81, 86 (1986).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 87.
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indicator of the general reaction to justices who take an independent
approach to state constitutions.
b. Hans Linde
Justice Hans Linde of the Oregon Supreme Court provides a better
example of the correlation between a justice's decision-making on con-
troversial state constitutional issues and vulnerability at election time.
Justice Linde has been the foremost state court justice to speak and
write, both in law reviews and in judicial opinions, on independent
interpretation of state constitutions. 47 His contributions to the
national debate on state constitutional law, as well as his leading role
in applying the theory of independent review to Oregon Supreme
Court decisions, has inspired and guided other state courts.
In 1984, an Oregon circuit court judge and a deputy prosecutor
challenged Justice Linde in what was characterized as a "spirited"
race for Linde's position on the Oregon court.148 One of the candidates
for the position asserted that Justice Linde "has consistently supported
expanded rights for criminal defendants." '149 Justice Linde's oppo-
nents were supported by "law-and-order" groups, including a group
that sought to amend the Oregon Constitution to restore capital pun-




c. Other Challenges to State Justices
Other state justices active in new federalism have also been success-
fully reelected. Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Judge Sam Houston,
a strong defender of state court independent analysis of the state con-
stitution to protect the criminally accused, overcame such a challenge
in 1984.152 Likewise, Chief Justice John A. Dixon, Jr. of Louisiana
147. E.g., Cooper v. Eugene School Dist., 301 Or. 358, 723 P.2d 298 (1986), appeal dismissed,
107 S.Ct. 1597 (1987); State v. Lowry, 295 Or. 337, 667 P.2d 996 (1983), overrruled in State v.
Owens, 302 Or. 196, 729 P.2d 524 (1986); State v. Kennedy, 295 Or. 260, 666 P.2d 1316 (1983);
State v. Clark, 291 Or. 231, 630 P.2d 810 (1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1084 (1981); State v.
Scharf, 288 Or. 621, 605 P.2d 690 (1980), overruled in State v. Newton, 291 Or. 788. 636 P.2d
393 (1981)); Linde, E Pluribus-Constitutional Theory and State Courts, 18 GA. L. REv. 165
(1984); Linde, supra note 71.
148. The Oregonian, Oct. 10, 1984, at C5, col. 1.
149. Id. at col. 3.
150. N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 1984, at A17, col. 1.
151. The Oregonian, Nov. 7, 1984, at Al, col. 5.
152. Collins, supra note 11, at 32.
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was reelected despite a campaign that highlighted his state constitu-
tional law stance on a death penalty case. 153
These election experiences do not constitute a meaningful statistical
sample. 154 There are, however, interesting points of comparison. The
resources of the group challenging a justice's reelection is one impor-
tant factor, as is the role of personalities and politics. There does not,
however, appear to be any sure indicator, including a judge's decisions
themselves, of how voters will respond. Indeed, the public often
ignores the fact that the court's majority signed an unpopular decision
and focuses on only one justice. 155 While unpopular decision-making
may form the basis of an election challenge to a justice, 156 generally
there is low voter interest in judicial elections. 157
The above accounts, however, represent exceptions to the norm. In
most states active in using their own constitutions, voters have not yet
mounted campaigns against state court justices applying state consti-
tutional law. Although the reasons for this may be complex, courts
are entitled to some extent to consider lack of voter backlash as a dem-
ocratic validation of their decisions.
3. Loss of Independence with Democratic Challenges
Democratic accountability of state appellate court judges does have
a reverse side. Where judges are politically accountable, there may be
a perception of loss, and possibly an actual loss, of judicial indepen-
dence. An inevitable tension develops between accountability and
independence in the judicial branch. 5 ' State courts are vulnerable to
these tensions, especially where their decisions relate to public
controversies.
In both California and Oregon, locations of recent strenuous elec-
tion challenges to "liberal" incumbent justices, the justices themselves
153. Id.
154. As Philip Dubois notes, anecdotes are a poor source of generalizations about judicial
elections. P.DuBois, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH: JUDICIAL ELECTIONS AND THE QUEsT FOR
ACCOUNTABILITY 34-35 (1980).
155. California voters passed over Justice Stanley Mosk, who is identified with expansion of
the state constitution to protect rights of the criminally accused, to focus on the politics and
policies of Chief Justice Rose Bird and the two other justices seen as her allies.
156. Ladinsky & Silver, Popular Democracy and Judicial Independence: Electorate and Elite
Reactions to Two Wisconsin Supreme Court Elections, 1967 Wis. L. RaV. 128, 129-30, 147-54
(discussing challenges to Wisconsin Supreme Court justices in 1964 and 1965 based on
unpopular liberal decisions).
157. See P. DUBOIS, supra note 154, at 36-100.
158. See, eg., id. at 20-28; C. SHELDON, supra note 4; Carbon, Judicial Retention Elections:
Are They Serving Their Intended Purpose, 64 JUDICATURE 210 (1980); Ladinsky & Silver, supra
note 156; Thompson, supra note 102.
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have decried the tone of those challenges as deterring judicial indepen-
dence.159 The California Supreme Court suffered more tangibly from
the political strife surrounding Rose Bird's appointment and eventual
rejection by voters. Before Chief Justice Bird's first retention cam-
paign, the press accused the California court of political motives in
delaying publication of already decided opinions, a tactic interpreted
as support for Justice Bird. 6 ' Accusations that a justice deliberately
postponed filing a controversial case until after the election ultimately
led to an inquiry by the California Commission on Judicial Perform-
ance, exposing the inner workings of court decision-making to the
public eye. 161
In sum, an inevitable tension lies between democratic accountabil-
ity and judicial independence at both the federal and the state level.
The challenge is to strike a workable balance for this inevitable ten-
sion, to pursue and preserve both of these clearly desirable goals.
Many states have increased democratic accountability of their judicial
branches, raising issues of judicial independence that normally do not
affect federal judges. 162 Whether or not states have found the correct
balance between the two competing values, the more democratic
nature of the state judiciary can provide positive feedback for assessing
state court independent decisions.
IV. STATE COURT CONTRIBUTIONS
The democratic input into judicial decision-making in the states
ranges between two extremes. At one extreme is California, with its
amendment initiatives and willingness to remove unpopular justices,
creating a possible "chill" on judicial independence. New Hampshire,
at the other end, appoints each justice for a term that ends on his or
her 70th birthday and requires a super-majority legislative and popu-
159. During the campaign against him, Justice Hans Linde stated as follows:
I think a great disservice to the public is being done by spreading doubt about the quality
of our Supreme Court. It is a nationally respected court, and that is in part because it has
not been a political court. That has made it possible to maintain a highly respected level of
performance.
The Oregonian, Oct. 10, 1984, at CS, col. 1; see also Collins, supra note 11, at 32 (quoting
Justice Linde's concern over "shrill and false attacks on court decisions" that might threaten
judicial independence).
160. P. STOLZ, supra note 143, at 122-36.
161. Id. at 119-91, 267-360.
162. However, even the reduced level of democratic accountability at the federal level has
caused concern about its effect on judicial independence. One aspect of the debate on the Bork
nomination was whether it was appropriate for the Senate to consider political factors in its
ratification decision.
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lar vote to amend the constitution.163 Along this continuum lies an
ideal balance of democracy and independence. 164 We can learn much
from the various experiences of the states as they struggle with the
issues of "new federalism" and the challenges of democratic input.
Justice Brandeis' dissent to New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 165 much
honored by its frequent quotation, states a compelling rationale for
independent state analysis: "It is one of the happy incidents of the
federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic exper-
iments without risk to the rest of the country." 16 6 Although Justice
Brandeis was not referring to experimentation in constitutional analy-
sis, time has shown that state courts'have acted as experimental labo-
ratories when interpreting their own constitutions. Chief Justice
William Rehnquist recently endorsed the application of Justice Bran-
deis' comments to independent state constitutional analysis, but cau-
tioned: "But I think that those who undertake these 'experiments,' to
use Justice Brandeis' term, must be willing to assume the responsibil-
ity for doing so." 1 67
"New federalism" decisions by state courts can educate the United
States Supreme Court on the states' acceptance of expanded individual
rights.168 California Supreme Court Justice Stanley Mosk, a staunch
advocate of state court independence in constitutional interpretation,
has also pointed out "the ability of the states to innovate and to create
new bodies of law, and to experiment." 169 Examples of innovative
state court decisions later incorporated by the United States Supreme
Court date back to the beginnings of this country. The very notion of
judicial review of legislative enactments traces back to state courts. 170
In a previous article, I discussed other examples of state courts devel-
oping constitutional analysis later adopted by the United States
163. THE BOOK OF THE STATES, supra note 100, at 16, 157, 164.
164. See Tribe, A Constitution We Are Amending: In Defense of a Restrained Judicial Role, 97
HARV. L. REv. 433 (1983).
165. 285 U.S. 262 (1932).
166. Id. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
167. W. Rehnquist, Remarks of the Chief Justice at the Nat'l Conf. of Chief Justices,
Williamsburg, Va. (Jan. 27, 1988) (copy on file with Washington Law Review).
168. See Project Report, supra note 56, at 290.
169. Unpublished interview with Justice Stanley Mosk, in San Francisco, Calif. (Jan. 24,
1981), quoted in Collins, supra note 66, at 7.
170. Corwin, supra note 26; Nelson, The Eighteenth Century Background of John Marshall's
Constitutional Jurisprudence, 76 MICH. L. REv. 893 (1978); Utter, Swimming in the Jaws of the
Crocodile: State Court Comment on Federal Constitutional Issues When Disposing of Cases on
State Constitutional Grounds, 63 TEx. L. REV. 1025, 1030 (1985).
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Supreme Court. 171 These include jurisprudence in the area of due pro-
cess, the first amendment, eminent domain, the right to bear arms, the
exclusionary rule, counsel for indigent defendants, and other rights for
the criminally accused. 17 2
State courts can contribute to federal constitutional analysis in two
ways. The courts can base their decisions on the federal Constitution,
using the analytical framework provided by the United States Supreme
Court if available, or developing an independent one if not available.
Alternatively, state courts can firmly base their decisions on state con-
stitutions and in the process provide analysis that the federal courts
might then use in interpreting the federal Constitution. 17  This is the
opposite direction that the flow of ideas had taken prior to "new feder-
alism." State courts that independently interpret their constitutions
might reject prior United States Supreme Court reasoning as inappro-
priate even if the language of the state constitutional provision at issue
is identical to its federal parallel.174 This practice presents a true chal-
lenge to the Supreme Court that may, along with scholarly and com-
munity criticism, result in the Court modifying or qualifying its
position."' In interpreting the federal Constitution, state and other
lower courts cannot directly challenge Supreme Court analyses. Thus,
only in state constitutional analysis may the state courts offer their
independent insights where the Supreme Court has already ruled on
an issue.
The greatest benefits of independent state analysis may occur, how-
ever, where the United States Supreme Court has not yet decided an
issue. In those cases, state courts relying only on the federal Constitu-
tion generally try to infer its probable decision by referring to Supreme
Court cases, often resorting to the Court's dicta.' 76 However, a state
court that applies its own constitution is not burdened with mandatory
171. Utter, supra note 170, at 1030-41.
172. Id.; see also Douglas, The Clash Over Constitutions: The Reassertion of State Authority,
26 JUDGES J. 39, 41 (Summer 1987); Kaye, Dual Constitutionalism in Practice and Principle, 61
ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 399, 425-26 (1987).
173. Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions: Some Random Thoughts, in DEVELOPMENTS IN
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (B. McGraw ed. 1985); Collins & Galie, supra note 54; Utter,
supra note 170, at 1029-42.
174. See Williams, State Constitutional Law Processes, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 169, 186
(1983).
175. See Kaye, supra note 172, at 425-26 & nn.87-91.
176. For example, the Court's dicta in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) concerning
nondiscretionary roadblocks have been used frequently by state courts attempting to determine
whether the Court will find sobriety checkpoints constitutional. Comment, DUI Roadblocks:
Drunk Drivers Take a Toll on the Fourth Amendment, 19 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 983, 1002-05
(1986).
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reliance on Supreme Court precedent. The result reached may also
appear to be more justified than the one flowing from federal
precedent.
One example from Washington shows how independent analysis
can free a state court to reach a conclusion that might differ from the
direction suggested by federal Supreme Court dicta. The Washington
Supreme Court is committed to what is called the dual sovereignty
approach. Under dual sovereignty, courts first address the state con-
stitutional grounds but also evaluate the claim under the federal Con-
stitution. 77  Using this approach in Seattle v. Mesiani,'78  the
Washington Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a
sobriety checkpoint program established by the Seattle Police Depart-
ment. The court found that the program violated article I, section 7 of
the Washington Constitution,' 79 noting that in Washington there is a
privacy interest in automobiles. The court also could find no "author-
ity of law" for the searches and seizures.' 80
By resting decisions on state court analysis, cases such as Mesiani
can provide the United States Supreme Court with an analysis of an
issue free of the constraint of attempting to determine how the Court
would decide. Of course, the state courts do not operate in a total
vacuum. To the contrary, these courts by tradition consider the juris-
prudence of federal and other state courts in deciding cases. Federal-
ism allows the state courts to interpret their constitutions
independently. The Supreme Court, in following state constitutional
decisions, can learn from that independent analysis.
The democratic input into the state system, arguably legitimating
state decisions through judicial elections and state constitutional
amendments, adds another source of information to the United States
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court can also see the repercussions of
177. State v. Coe, 101 Wash. 2d 364, 679 P.2d 353 (1984); see Utter & Pitler, Presenting a
State Constitutional Argument: Comment on Theory and Technique, 20 IND. L. REv. 635, 651-53
(1987); Utter, supra note 170.
178. 110 Wash. 2d 454, 775 P.2d 755 (1988).
179. "No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without
authority of law." WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7.
180. After resting its holding on state constitutional grounds, the Mesiani court briefly
analyzed the issue under the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution. The
Washington Supreme Court's policy is to consider the federal issue even where a case is decided
under the state constitution in order to assist other state and federal courts. Seattle v. Mesiani,
110 Wash. 2d 454, 458, 755 P.2d 775, 777 (1988); State v. Coe, 101 Wash. 2d 364, 679 P.2d 353
(1984). The Washington Supreme Court concluded that the United States Constitution also
barred Seattle's sobriety checkpoint program, in light of the intrusive nature of a search for
evidence of intoxication and the lack of a showing of less intrusive means to achieve the city's
purposes. Mesiani, 110 Wash. 2d at 458-60, 775 P.2d at 777-78.
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state court decisions on the states. An interpretation of a state consti-
tution may be felt by the citizens to conflict with deeply held values,
and lead them to enact an amendment that precludes that interpreta-
tion. Alternatively, if the public ratifies state supreme court decisions
by inaction, this may be useful information to the federal Supreme
Court in assessing the consequences of its own jurisprudence if it
chooses to follow the reasoning of state court decisions.
Popular reaction to state court decisions is inevitable, whether
viewed as a positive phenomenon, enlightening the courts on deeply
held popular values, or whether seen negatively, threatening judicial
independence. If the supporters of unpopular jurisprudence perceive
that public backlash stems from misunderstandings of the law, then
they may consider how to better educate the public.
Although the ballot may be a tangible disincentive to independent
constitutional jurisprudence, as the second quote at the beginning of
this article suggests, it has not in fact been so in most state constitu-
tional decisions. State supreme court justices live with the reality that
most of them are in some manner accountable to the public about
their decisions. This has not generally lessened their fidelity to their
oaths of office to support the Constitution of the United States and the
constitutions of their respective states. It has, however, made state
judges aware of the need to be sensitive to public concerns and to care-
fully explain why value choices that must be made in decisions are
chosen. State judges also frequently participate in public education
regarding the role of the courts in a constitutional government. This is
part of the ongoing education of the public for the support that judges
must give to basic concepts of personal rights contained in the bills of
rights of the federal and state constitutions." 1 Constitutional jurispru-
dence in states across the country and in federal courts will benefit
from the fresh analyses used by the independent state courts. Ulti-
mately, both the state courts and the states themselves can be useful
181. The author of an article on the use of amendments to overturn state constitutional
jurisprudence aptly summarized the position in which justices in the states find themselves when
developing their state constitutional jurisprudence:
Courts are aware of the institutional constraints under which they must operate. Yet,
courts must be careful not to become mere weathervanes of popular attitudes. In the main,
the judiciary responds to this antimony by exercising circumspection and restraint. There
is, of course, the possibility of excess. Judicial decisions in a particular area of state
constitutional jurisprudence may exceed the existing consensus; this sometimes will generate
popular dissatisfaction. That this dissatisfaction may be acknowledged and addressed either
internally by a state supreme court through doctrinal reformulation or popularly by ballot
proposition should hardly cause one to question the underlying vitality of the judicial
process.
FISCHER, supra note 98, at 88.
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experimental laboratories for the development of constitutional juris-
prudence by the United States Supreme Court, but can also add demo-
cratic legitimation to federal doctrine.
V. CONCLUSION
The reliance on state constitutions as the source of many of our
individual rights is part of the historic fabric of the United States. The
democratic contributions to the state judicial system add a distinct tex-
ture to state court jurisprudence and serve a unique function in con-
tributing to federal constitutional jurisprudence. It remains to be seen
how the personalities of the various state courts and state populations
will combine in the diversity of state constitutional interpretation.
This diversity is inevitable, given the varying language and histories of
the state constitutions, the willingness of some state courts to go far-
ther than others in independent jurisprudence, and the differences
between states in democratic contributions. Yet this diversity is also
desirable. It widens the range of constitutional analysis and allows the
results of each state's experimentation to benefit all other courts, fed-
eral as well as state.
